

BME6001 Business Policy and Strategy

Strategic Analysis and Planning Report: Mobilé Inc. Global Challenge

DEMONSTRATION VERSION USING SYNTHETIC SIMULATION DATA

Student: [Insert name]

Student ID: [Insert ID]

Cesim group/team:

Executive Summary

Throughout this report, a full demonstration scenario for Mobilé Inc. is analysed by means of 6 CESIM rounds that are scored. The synthetic team in the USA and Europe has taken a selective differentiation approach; Asia has been playing expansion, and in between, a moderate risk policy has been decided. The strategy resulted in revenue growth from \$1,180.8m in Round 1 to \$2,030.9m in Round 6, and an operating margin from 12.8% in Round 1 to an increased margin of 24.0% in Round 6. Cumulative Shareholder Return (CSR) was 26.4% compared to 4.0% last quarter, and ended up with a 2nd-place synthetic ranking out of 6 teams.

That key strategic consideration was "sequencing," not going for everything at once. However, Technology 2 was developed in-house and launched initially in the USA and Europe (Round 3), and Asia (Round 4) subsequent to improvements in networks and local capacity. A greater level of underforecasting of Asian demand in rounds 1-2 led to a higher share of subcontracting and an investment in the Asian plant. Subsequently, price wars were avoided, and price reductions were decided on a case-by-case basis whilst facing competitor price reductions.

An analysis reveals that the market selection, technology, pricing, capacity, finance and logistics were aligned as crucial sources of competitive advantage. The best proof is that since the Round 3-4 pivots, all three aspects of market share increase, operating margin and CSR scores moved up hand in hand. Also, governance was crucial; a cross-functional review helped to prevent marketing, operations and finance from optimising their own objectives. The key takeaway: Growth models only generate value for the shareholders if they are coherent in terms of timing, capability and execution.

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1. Introduction

This report is a critique of strategic, policy and operational decisions through a six-round demonstration of the Mobilé Inc. Global Challenge. The package provided here is a simulated structure consisting of two practice rounds and six real rounds with the number of students (five) and the number of teams (six) per group as described above. This is to illustrate how a final submission may relate round evidence to strategic theory, and not necessarily decisions in isolation.

Where a firm chooses to compete and how it chooses to compete is strategy; how much to finance, how much research and development to do, how much capacity, how much risk, and what operations the firm decides to engage in are policy decisions that take the strategy decision and turn it into forecasts, production, and marketing and logistics (Grant, 2021; Whittington et al., 2023). The analysis takes into account the regional environments, generic competitive positioning, Ansoff-type growth selections and the resource-based view and strategic fit. In this version of the game, all numbers are fabricated and used transparently as evidence in the game.

2. The External Business Environment

2.1 Regional market conditions

Contextualising markets in three different environments by simulation. The home market is the USA, where growth is expected to be 5-10% and with a good advertising response. Growth is around 10%, and their product attributes are valued the most in Europe. Asia is also the most dynamic, with growth of 20% or more, but is also more sensitive to price; some early adopters and customers are happy with the older technology. The variation in these differences precludes the possibility of having a singular offer globally. The demo strategy was the one in which Europe got the richest set of features, starting with Europe (European R1) having 6, while in Europe (European R6) it had 9 features. Asia started with three features and a smaller price, while the USA's strategy was to be in a balanced position backed up by advertising (Razzak, 2023).

2.2 Technology and infrastructure

Network infrastructure became a limitation when technology timing became an issue. To provide a handset that offered Technology 2 service was not viable where there was no compatible coverage. So the team went ahead with development of T2 within R1 - R2, but

they were waiting for commercial. T2 was introduced in R3 to the USA and Europe when coverage and willingness to pay indicated this was appropriate (Rahman and Rahman, 2020). Asia continued on T1 for one extra round. The introduction of more local capacity was hugely developed in R4 and that's when T2 was launched in Asia. The sequence in particular kept innovation expenditure from being wasted and provides an example of the importance of a fit of time to innovation and readiness on the market side (Adomako and Tran, 2022).

2.3 Regulatory, competitive and sustainability implications

Competitive production would be out of the question due to the high costs of labour and rigid labour conditions in Europe, so that production in Asia would offer an advantage with regard to transport and tariff costs (Rahman *et al.*, 2023). There was greater competition too, as all companies started from the same point. During the first 2 rounds, competitor CSR held on to a higher percentage of the global market, with the team increasing from 14.8% to 20.8% market share during the demo. This further highlighted the need to "beat others" and not rejoice in "gaining ground. Sustainability was therefore considered to be financial and resource durability, as the simulation doesn't directly give an environmental score. For instance, the reduced cost of redundant products, excess freight and unutilized capacity has led to more efficient costs and greater resilience (Almarayeh *et al.*, 2023).

3. Corporate Policy Context

3.1 Capital structure and risk appetite

The corporation followed a moderate but not a high-risk corporate policy during the entire course of the planning, which demonstrated a conscious choice in favor of financial strength, instead of leveraged growth. It has been funding its growth mainly by the accrual of internal cash generated as a result of operations and the firm never took to excessive reliance on long term or short term funding. This conservatism implied that debt was seen as a strategic tool that was nothing more than an occasion-driven requirement of the investment program, but not an established part of the balance sheet. Long term debt increased between R1 at 160m and R3 at 280m with simultaneous funding needed on both the T2 product development programme and expansion of Asian manufacturing capacity is met. When these commitments matured and the cash generation started to surge the firm gradually got deleveraged and the long-term debts of R6 had been brought down to the R1 stage of R160m. The arc then depicts a disciplined debt cycle: borrow to finance strategic step-changes and then pay back as those investments start to pay off.

This logic was reflected in dividend policy. No dividends were paid during the establishment phase when the business was still recapitalizing to build up the product and capacity development and this enabled retained earnings to strengthen the equity base. Shareholder distributions were initiated, and these were proportional to the earning capacity, as the business was converted to sustained cash generation: \$10m in R4, \$18m in R5 and \$25m in R6. This policy created appreciable financial flexibility on the asset side in the face of a market uncertainty and on the cash flow side turned operating prowess into a solid shareholder payoff (Abdelilah et al., 2023). This trend aligns with the opinion that capital structure is long-term strategic positioning and not limit imposed by short-term financial considerations, and it gave the company the flexibility to act in response to competitive actions without necessarily having to engage in dilutive equity issues or distressed borrowing.

3.2 R&D and capacity policy

R&D policy was picked up to select plating factors for internal development. The amount of internal R&D increased from R1 - \$95m to R2 - \$125m with T2 readying itself. In R3, an additional \$35m licence was purchased to fill a feature gap at the time of launch, but since then, the company has seen decreasing licensing as internal competencies have grown. This spared the cost of not making a market-timing decision at the expense of long-term learning (Ferreira et al., 2021). Capacity could be worked out similarly. To this, a gradual increase in the total internal capacity (mainly in Asia) and some skewing and rescheduling with subcontracts served as a buffer (Andreini *et al.*, 2022). The quantity of internal capacity in the Asian division would grow from R1 0.45m to R6 1.30m. This reaction was caused by a decrease in sales in R1-R2 and less exposure to transport and tariff costs in the future.

Internal capacity in the Asian division grew from 0.45m units in R1 to 1.30m units in R6, almost tripling over the planning horizon. The pace of this build-out was shaped partly by the softer sales environment in R1–R2 and partly by the strategic intention to reduce exposure to transport costs and tariff risk in later rounds. Together, the R&D and capacity policies reinforced the moderate financial posture by matching investment commitments to the firm's demonstrated capacity to generate internal funds.

4. Competitive and Business Strategy Evaluation

4.1 Competitive strategy

Business strategy differentiated, plus selective cost discipline. The clearest market was Europe where the price of the price has increased from \$470 in R1 to \$535, in R3, for the T2 launch, and the features have increased to eight. USA adopted an approach of a healthy mix of differentiation with promotion of roughly 4-5% of sales. Asia stayed more value-based, with T1 at \$385 in R1 and \$365 in R3. The price of T2 had dropped to \$430 when it hit Asia on R4, and this was well below the European T2 price. This prevented the pricing strategy of "one size fits all" premium pricing from being followed (Arend, 2020).

An important criterion is whether the activities supported each other, rather than whether the individual decisions made sense. The European T2 launch, for instance, featured more than just increased features, premium pricing, better promotion, and adequate capacity; it also had increased features, premium pricing, better promotion, and adequate capacity. Revenue grew to \$1,591.1m with no sales lost, and operating margin expanded to 13.9%. In Asia, by contrast, R2 experienced a mismatch with demand ahead of forecast and capacity, resulting in 0.125m units of lost sales across the portfolio (Barney and Hesterly, 2020). It was not about reducing prices or increasing promotion, but modifying the capacity architecture.

4.2 Strategic direction and pivots

The growth path can be looked at in terms of an Ansoff logic. Early rounds focused on penetration in the USA and Europe, leveraging on T1 existing products. An increase in market development was driven by R2, primarily through subcontracting and not irreversible capacity, in Asia. R3 involved selective market development by launching the T2 in the USA/EU and by approving an Asian plant in combination with developing the product. Next, T2 was extended to Asia by R4. Sequencing due to the lesser risks involved with doing so while trying to enter new product and new markets.

There were 3 pivots made, all of which were material. First, more subcontracting was undertaken, and the idea of the Asian plant was decided upon because of Asian shortages (Biswas, 2022). Secondly, T2 was launched geographically, not globally. Third, R5 competitor price pressure was met with selective reductions: the USA price dropped from \$500 to \$495 and Asia from \$430 to \$420, while the price in Europe has stayed relatively high at \$520. However, the team did not consider a general out-competing through price

reduction, as operating margin had gained to 19.6% in R4 and it was a strategic imperative to protect value, not destroy it. CSR consequently increased from 18.5% to 22.1% in R5 and 26.4% in R6.

4.3 Resource-based advantage and performance

Relatively valuable and inimitable were basic cash, access to and capacity to use technology. Coordination, the ability to interpret network forecasts, coordinate the timing of R&D activities with capacity, and adjust regional offers and learning across the rounds, however, proved more defensible. This ability was manifested from R2 to R4. In comparison to R2, the lost sales dropped from 0.125m from R3 onward up to R4; revenue increased 38% while the team moved from 4th ranking to 2nd ranking. Thus, the advantage is not about ownership of the asset, but the organisational system according to the resource-based view (Chiarelli, 2021). What rivals could not easily replicate was the embedded routine of linking demand signals to pricing, specification and capacity decisions within a single planning cycle, since this depended on accumulated team learning rather than any single purchasable input. The gradual tightening of forecast error, the smoother alignment between launch timing and plant readiness, and the increasingly selective use of discounting all point to a path-dependent capability that strengthened with each round. Consistent with Barney's VRIO logic, it was this socially complex coordination, rather than the underlying assets themselves, that converted comparable resources into a durable competitive position and sustained the ranking improvement into the later rounds




Figure 1. Synthetic CSR trend against competitor average.




Figure 2. Synthetic regional market-share development.

5. Operational Alignment and Execution

5.1 Forecasting and capacity

In this case, forecasting would be very strategic, as it is a case about Just-in-Time production having no finished goods inventory. For the synthetic data, both the aggregate forecasting values were close, but the R2 was 4.8% lower than the actual value for demand. Asia proved to be the source of the majority of errors, which led to the capacity shortage and lost sales (Ferreira et al., 2021). The team, for its part, took the following countermeasures: Network Forecasting as a leading indicator. At R3, no sales were lost despite the fact that the demand is picking up. There were small deficits of just 0.025m and 0.0125m in R5 and R6, respectively. This illustrates a key reason to consider forecasting as part of the management of capacity lead time and strategic timing, as a single process (Grant, 2021).

For products where demand did not change, internal production was kept even though it provided learning curve benefits. As a buffer, subcontracting was utilized (Hanelt et al., 2021). Later on, the internal base in Asia increased, and the buffer of the subcontract was kept at around 0.4 – 0.45m units. This avoided above-average capacity at the same time ensuring that sales did not suffer because of business demand fluctuations, in line with supply chain resilience logic.

The deeper lesson from the R2 shortfall was that forecast error is not uniformly distributed across regions, and that treating a network-level accuracy figure as adequate can disguise material gaps at the plant level. Asia carried disproportionate error because its demand base was growing faster, its channel structure was less mature, and its price-elasticity behaviour was still being learned. From R3 onward, the team therefore began disaggregating forecasts by region before committing capacity, cross-checking each regional projection against the network forecast and against competitor move patterns observed in the prior round. This triangulation reduced the risk of a single optimistic signal driving an irreversible capacity decision, since internal plant expansions carried a lead time that could not be compressed once construction had begun.

Capacity planning was then organised around a layered logic in which stable baseline demand was served by internal plants, growth demand was tested through subcontracting, and only demand increments that had proved durable across two consecutive rounds were converted into permanent internal capacity. This stepwise commitment mechanism meant that the organisation was effectively buying real options rather than placing single large bets, and it allowed capital to be redeployed quickly if a regional trend reversed. The sustained subcontract buffer of 0.4 – 0.45m units was retained even as internal Asian capacity grew, because it preserved the flexibility to absorb short-term spikes without carrying the fixed cost penalty of permanently over-sized plants. The small residual deficits in R5 and R6 should therefore be read not as planning failures but as evidence of a deliberate trade-off between service level and asset utilisation, since eliminating them entirely would have required capacity levels that would have depressed returns in any softer round. Taken together, the forecasting and capacity routines matured from a reactive, aggregate exercise in R1–R2 into an integrated, region-sensitive planning system by R4–R6, which is consistent with the view that operational resilience is built through repeated cycles of forecast calibration and capacity learning rather than through a single structural fix (Grant, 2021).

5.2 Marketing mix and logistics

The marketing mix and SCLP are the two key concepts in the marketing field. The marketing mix was tailored according to their region. The feature intensity and promotion were the highest in Europe at nearly 5% of sales. All USA promotion was still in double digits at 4.%. Asia ad monitoring was utilised less, and the prices were lower since the customers were more price sensitive. The product-price-promotion configuration consequently demonstrates value to customers as opposed to a unified budget worldwide (Jancenelle *et al.*, 2022).

Logistics strengthened the regional focus; more Asian capacities met Asian demands, leading to less exposure to transport and tariff rates. Operating profit increased from \$151.7m in R1 to \$486.4m in R6 while revenue rose from \$1,180.8m to \$2,030.9m. The growing difference indicates that scale, learning, local production and disciplined marketing were well combined rather than an increase in volume of sales (Novak *et al.*, 2021).




Figure 3. Synthetic revenue and operating-profit development.

6. Strategic Governance and Learning

Governance was established to focus on marketing, operations, finance/R&D and coordination, all in a five-person team structure. All the functional leads developed a first draft of their recommendations, and the team analysed one set of integrated recommendations prior to finalizing (Khan, 2021). The coordinator dealt with the conflicts and discussed them with the common goal of CSR, which is long-term. The significance of this process was that although a marketing choice may be to reduce the price, this could result in more demand than the capacity to supply, whereas a finance decision could be to limit a company's investment in technology that could have an adverse impact on the timing (Kotler *et al.*, 2022). Thus, local optimisation was a problem due to cross-functional challenges.

The most beneficial governance event was after R2. Marketing saw Asian growth as an opportunity to stimulate more demand, and operations said it was capacity that was the constraining factor (Lotfi, 2022). The team opted to reduce capacity pressure through subcontracting rather than additional promotion. This fact was confirmed in R3, with each

lost sale coming back and the rank soon improving from fourth to third. There was an explicit devil's-advocate role for the team in R5 where they tested serving a large range of competitor-matching price cuts, which was deemed too risky to affect the margin position and differentiation position (Ngatno et al., 2021). This is an example of strategic learning; the outcome was used as proof of the assumptions instead of it being a winning or losing outcome (Manzoor et al., 2022). The team implemented strategic changes whenever evidence suggested that they were warranted but refrained from reacting to each change in competitor behaviour.

Beyond these set-piece decisions, the governance structure also shaped how routine information was translated into action between rounds. Each functional lead was expected to arrive at the integration meeting with a written rationale rather than a verbal preference, which forced assumptions about demand elasticity, competitor response and capacity ramp times to be made explicit before any trade-off was negotiated. This small procedural discipline reduced the influence of personality and seniority on outcomes and made it easier to revisit decisions in later rounds without defensiveness, since the original reasoning was recorded and could be tested against new evidence. The coordinator's role was therefore less about resolving disputes in the moment and more about maintaining the continuity of the team's reasoning across rounds, so that strategic choices accumulated into a coherent trajectory rather than resetting with each new scenario.

A further element of learning came from the deliberate separation of signal from noise in competitor behaviour. Not every competitor move was treated as strategically meaningful, and the team developed an informal threshold whereby a rival action was only reacted to if it persisted across two rounds or materially altered the price-feature frontier in a segment the firm served. This restraint protected the long-term positioning strategy from being eroded by tactical skirmishes and allowed scarce management attention to be concentrated on the structural decisions, such as capacity location and R&D sequencing, where the firm's choices had the greatest long-run consequence (Manzoor et al., 2022). The result was a governance system that behaved less like a committee reacting to events and more like a learning organisation refining a shared model of the industry.

7. Conclusion

The demonstration demonstrates the performance gains Mobilé experienced when it aligned on a regional positioning, technology timing and financing & operations. Key decision-making factors in the rise include staged T2 launch and the Asian capacity pivot which helped CSR achieve a 26.4% figure, second out of six of the synthetic teams. Coordinated decision capability, not a product or a market, was a basis for competitive advantage. The challenges are requests to expand and grow as technology readiness, capacity and financial slack permit; apply subcontracting and licensing judiciously where timely decisions are required; exercise cross-functional challenge in decision-making (Mukhsin and Suryanto, 2022). Additional rounds would involve earlier activation of Asian capacity, and the development of competitor-response floors, while maintaining the same strategic approach, disciplined by evidence.

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
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Appendices

Appendix A1: Synthetic round summary

Round	Revenue mUSD	Operating profit	OP margin	CSR	Rank	Global share
R1	1,180.8	151.7	12.8%	4.0%	5	14.8%
R2	1,318.8	161.5	12.2%	8.1%	4	15.9%
R3	1,591.1	221.7	13.9%	13.6%	3	17.6%
R4	1,824.6	357.1	19.6%	18.5%	2	19.3%
R5	1,935.8	438.2	22.6%	22.1%	2	20.1%
R6	2,030.9	486.4	24.0%	26.4%	2	20.8%



Appendix Figure A1. Synthetic simulation dashboard.

Appendix A2: Round-by-round strategic decision log

Round	Decision	Trigger/rationale	Outcome
R1	T1 focus; start T2 R&D	Build capability before network readiness	CSR 4.0%; rank 5
R2	Expand Asia with subcontracting	Asian demand exceeded forecast	CSR 8.1%; 0.125m lost sales
R3	Launch T2 USA/Europe; approve Asia plant	Coverage viable; feature demand strongest in Europe	CSR 13.6%; rank 3; zero lost sales
R4	Launch T2 Asia; localise capacity	Network ready and plant available	CSR 18.5%; rank 2
R5	Selective price response	Competitor price cuts and market crowding	CSR 22.1%; margin 22.6%
R6	Consolidate; repay debt; increase dividend	Strong cash generation and mature T2 portfolio	CSR 26.4%; final rank 2